Abstract. Password-based encrypted key exchange are protocols that are designed to provide pair of users communicating over an unreliable channel with a secure session key even when the secret key or password shared between two users is drawn from a small set of values. In this paper, we present two simple password-based encrypted key exchange protocols based on that of Bellovin and Merritt. While one protocol is more suitable to scenarios in which the password is shared across several servers, the other enjoys better security properties. Both protocols are as efficient, if not better, as any of the existing encrypted key exchange protocols in the literature, and yet they only require a single random oracle instance. The proof of security for both protocols is in the random oracle model and based on hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. However, some of the techniques that we use are quite different from the usual ones and make use of new variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem, which are of independent interest. We also provide concrete relations between the new variants and the standard Diffie-Hellman problem.
Introduction
Background. Keys exchange protocols are cryptographic primitives used to provide a pair of users communicating over a public unreliable channel with a secure session key. In practice, one can find several flavors of key exchange protocols, each with its own benefits and drawbacks. An example of a popular one is the SIGMA protocol [18] used as the basis for the signature-based modes of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. The setting in which we are interested in this paper is the 2-party symmetric one, in which every pair of users share a secret key. In particular, we consider the scenario in which the secret key is a password.
Password-based key exchange. Password-based key exchange protocols assume a more realistic scenario in which secret keys are not uniformly distributed over a large space, but rather chosen from a small set of possible values (a four-digit pin, for example). They also seem more convenient since human-memorable passwords are simpler to use than, for example, having additional cryptographic devices capable of storing high-entropy secret keys. The vast majority of protocols found in practice do not account, however, for such scenario and are often subject to so-called dictionary attacks. Dictionary attacks are attacks in which an adversary tries to break the security of a scheme by a brute-force method, in which it tries all possible combinations of secret keys in a given small set of values (i.e., the dictionary). Even though these attacks are not very effective in the case of high-entropy keys, they can be very damaging when the secret key is a password since the attacker has a non-negligible chance of winning.
To address this problem, several protocols have been designed to be secure even when the secret key is a password. The goal of these protocols is to restrict the adversary's success to on-line guessing attacks only. In these attacks, the adversary must be present and interact with the system in order to be able to verify whether its guess is correct. The security in these systems usually relies on a policy of invalidating or blocking the use of a password if a certain number of failed attempts has occurred.
Encrypted key exchange. The seminal work in the area of password-based key exchange is the encrypted key exchange (EKE) protocol of Bellovin and Merritt [7] . In their protocol, two users execute an encrypted version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, in which each flow is encrypted using the password shared between these two users as the symmetric key. Due to the simplicity of their protocol, several other protocols were proposed in the literature based on it [6, 9, 10, 17, 20] , each with its own instantiation of the encryption function. Our protocol is also a variation of their EKE protocol.
Minimizing the use of random oracles. One of our main goals is to provide schemes that are simple and efficient, but relying as little as possible on random oracles. Ideally, one would want to completely eliminate the need of random oracles as done in the KOY protocol [16] . However, such protocols tend to be less efficient than those based on the EKE protocol of Bellovin and Merritt [7] . To understand the difficulties involved in the design of protocols with few random oracles, let us consider the extreme case of the protocol in Figure 1 in which no random oracles are used. Despite being secure against passive attacks, this protocol can be easily broken by an active adversary performing a man-in-the-middle attack. Such an adversary can easily create two different sessions whose session keys are related in a predictable manner. For instance, an adversary can do so by multiplying X by g r for a known value r. The relation between the underlying session keys SK A and SK B is SK B = SK A · Y r . Hence, if the adversary learns the value of these two keys, it can perform an off-line dictionary attack using Y = (SK B /SK A ) −r and Y to recover the password. Moreover, since the adversary can use arbitrary values for r, we cannot detect such attacks.
Protecting against related key attacks. In order to fix the problem in the protocol presented in Figure 1 and prevent the adversary from altering the messages, one may be tempted to use message authentication code (MAC) algorithms for key derivation (e.g., by making the session key equal to MAC SK A (A, B, X , Y , 0)) or key confirmation (e.g., by computing tags via MAC SK A (A, B, X , Y , 1)). In fact, this is the approach used by Kobara and Imai in the construction of their password-authenticated key exchange protocol [17] . Unfortunately, this approach does not quite work.
Let us now explain the main problems with using MACs. First, the standard notion of security for MACs does not imply security against related key attacks. Hence, new and stronger security notions are required. Second, such new security notions may have to consider adversaries which are given access to a related-key tag-generation oracle. These are oracles that are capable of generating tags on messages under related keys, where the related key function is also passed as a parameter. This is actually the approach used in [17] . However, it is not clear whether such MACs can even be built. Such security notion, for instance, may completely rule out the possibility of using block-cipher-based MAC algorithms since similar security requirements in the context of block ciphers are known to be impossible to achieve [2] . Perhaps, hash-based MAC algorithms may be able to meet these goals, but that does not seem likely without resorting to random oracles, which would defeat the purpose of using MACs in the first place.
Simple constructions. In this paper, we deal with the problem of related-key attacks by using a single instance of a random oracle in the key derivation process. We present two simple constructions, whose only difference to one another is the presence of the password in the key derivation function. The presence of the password in the key derivation function is an important aspect, for example, when one wants to consider extensions to the distributed case, where each server only holds a share of password (see [11] ).
Surprisingly, the techniques that we use to prove the security of these two constructions are quite different and so are the exact security results. While we are able to provide a tight security reduction for the scheme which includes the password in the key derivation phase, the same cannot be said about the other scheme, for which we can only prove its security in the non-concurrent scenario. However, the techniques that we use to prove the security of the latter are quite interesting and make use of new variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem.
New Diffie-Hellman assumptions. The new variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem that we introduce are called Chosen-Basis Diffie-Hellman assumptions due to the adversary's capability to choose some of the bases used in the definition of the problem. These assumptions are particular interesting when considered in the context of password-based protocols and we do expect to find applications for them other than the ones in this paper. Despite being apparently stronger than the standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions, we prove that this is not the case by providing concrete reductions to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
Contributions. In this paper, we address the issue of constructing efficient password-based encrypted key exchange protocols. Our main contributions are as follows.
Simple and efficient constructions in random oracle model. In this paper, we propose two new password-based encrypted key exchange protocols, called SPAKE1 and SPAKE2, both of which can be proven secure based on the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model. Both protocols are comparable in efficiency to any of the existing EKE protocols, if not more efficient, and they only require one random oracle instance. This is contrast with existing EKE constructions, which require either a larger number of random oracle instances or additional ideal models, such as the ideal cipher model. Moreover, neither SPAKE1 nor SPAKE2 requires full domain hash functions or ideal ciphers onto a group, which are hard to implement efficiently. While one protocol is more suitable to scenarios in which the password is shared across several servers, the other enjoys better security properties.
New Diffie-Hellman assumptions. In proving the security of our protocols, we make use of new variations of the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, called chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions. These new assumptions are of independent interest and we do expect to find new applications for it other than the ones in this paper. Reductions between the problems underlying the new assumptions and the standard computational Diffie-Hellman assumption are also provided.
Related work. Password-based authenticated key exchange has been extensively studied in the last few years [3, 8-10, 12-14, 16, 19, 21, 11] with the majority of them being submitted for inclusion in the IEEE P1363.2 standard [15] , a standard dealing with the issues of passwordauthenticated key agreement (e.g. EKE) and password-authenticated key retrieval. With the exception of [12, 13, 16] , all of these protocols are only proven secure in the random oracle model.
Perhaps, the related work that is closest to ours is the pretty-simple password-authenticated key exchange protocol of Kobara and Imai [17] , whose proof of security is claimed to be in the "standard" model. Their protocol consists of EKE phase that is similar to the one used in our protocols followed by an authentication phase based on message authentication code (MAC) algorithms. However, the security model which they use is different from the standard one and hence their result only applies to their specific model. Moreover, as we pointed out above, their protocol needs a stronger security notion for the MAC algorithm and it is not clear whether such MACs can be built without resorting to random oracles, which would contradict their claims.
Organization. In Section 2, we recall the security model for password-based authenticated key exchange. Next, in Section 3, we present our new variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem and their relations to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Section 4 then introduces the first of our password-based encrypted key exchange protocols, called SPAKE1, along with its proof of security. SPAKE1 is in fact based on one of the variants of the Diffie-Hellman problem introduced in Section 3. Our second protocol, SPAKE2, is then presented in Section 4 along with its security claims. In the appendix, we present proofs for several lemmas in Section 3 as well as the proof of security for SPAKE2.
Security model for password-based key exchange
We now recall the security model for password-based authenticated key exchange of Bellare et al. [3] .
Protocol participants. Each participant in the password-based key exchange is either a client C ∈ C or a server S ∈ S. The set of all users or participants U is the union C ∪ S.
Long-lived keys. Each client C ∈ C holds a password pw C . Each server S ∈ S holds a vector pw S = pw S [C] C∈C with an entry for each client, where pw S [C] is the transformed-password, as defined in [3] . In this paper, we only consider the symmetric model, in which pw S [C] = pw C , but they may be different in general. pw C and pw S are also called the long-lived keys of client C and server S.
Protocol execution. The interaction between an adversary A and the protocol participants occurs only via oracle queries, which model the adversary capabilities in a real attack. During the execution, the adversary may create several instances of a participant. While in a concurrent model, several instances may be active at any given time, only one active user instance is allowed for a given intended partner and password in a non-concurrent model. Let U i denote the instance i of a participant U and let b be a bit chosen uniformly at random. The query types available to the adversary are as follows:
-Execute(C i , S j ): This query models passive attacks in which the attacker eavesdrops on honest executions between a client instance C i and a server instance S j . The output of this query consists of the messages that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol. -Send(U i , m): This query models an active attack, in which the adversary may tamper with the message being sent over the public channel. The output of this query is the message that the participant instance U i would generate upon receipt of message m.
-Reveal(U i ): This query models the misuse of session keys by a user. If a session key is not defined for instance U i or if a Test query was asked to either U i or to its partner, then return ⊥. Otherwise, return the session key held by the instance U i . -Test(U i ): This query tries to capture the adversary's ability to tell apart a real session key from a random one. If no session key for instance U i is defined, then return the undefined symbol ⊥. Otherwise, return the session key for instance U i if b = 1 or a random key of the same size if b = 0.
Notation. Following [4, 5] , an instance U i is said to be opened if a query Reveal(U i ) has been made by the adversary. We say an instance U i is unopened if it is not opened. We say an instance U i has accepted if it goes into an accept mode after receiving the last expected protocol message.
Partnering. The definition of partnering uses the notion of session identifications (sid). More specifically, two instances U i 1 and U accepts with a partner identification equal to
In practice, the sid could be taken to be the partial transcript of the conversation between the client and the server instances before the acceptance.
Freshness. The notion of freshness is defined to avoid cases in which adversary can trivially break the security of the scheme. The goal is to only allow the adversary to ask Test queries to fresh oracle instances. More specifically, we say an instance U i is fresh if it has accepted and if both U i and its partner are unopened.
Semantic security. Consider an execution of the key exchange protocol P by an adversary A, in which the latter is given access to the Reveal, Execute, Send, and Test oracles and asks a single Test query to a fresh instance, and outputs a guess bit b . Such an adversary is said to win the experiment defining the semantic security if b = b, where b is the hidden bit used by the Test oracle.
Let Succ denote the event in which the adversary is successful. The ake-advantage of an adversary A in violating the semantic security of the protocol P and the advantage function of the protocol P , when passwords are drawn from a dictionary D, are respectively
where maximum is over all A with time-complexity at most t and using resources at most R (such as the number of queries to its oracles). The definition of time-complexity that we use henceforth is the usual one, which includes the maximum of all execution times in the experiments defining the security plus the code size [1] .
Diffie-Hellman assumptions
In this section, we recall the definitions for the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and introduce some new variants of it, which we use in the proof of security of simple password-based encrypted key exchange protocols. We also present some relations between these assumptions. In doing so, we borrow some of the notations in [1] . 
Definitions
Notation. In the following, we assume a finite cyclic group G of prime order p generated by an element g. We also call the tuple G = (G, g, p) the represented group.
Computational Diffie-Hellman: CDH. The CDH assumption states that given g u and g v , where u and v were drawn at random from Z p , it is hard to compute g uv . Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption it might be possible for the adversary to compute something interesting about g uv given g u and g v .
This can be defined more precisely by considering an Experiment Exp cdh G (A), in which we select two values u and v in Z p , compute U = g u , and V = g v , and then give both U and V to an adversary A. Let Z be the output of A. Then, the Experiment Exp Chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman: CCDH. The chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman problem is a variation of the CDH problem. It considers an adversary that is given three random elements M , N and X in G and whose goal is to find a triple of values (Y, u, v) such that u = CDH(X, Y ) and v = CDH(X/M, Y /N ). The idea behind this assumption is that the adversary may be able to successfully compute either u (e.g., by choosing Y = g and u = X) or v (e.g., by choosing Y = g · N and v = X/M ), but not both. In fact, as we prove later, solving this problem is equivalent to solving the underlying computational Diffie-Hellman problem in G. We now proceed with the formal definition.
Definition 1 (CCDH).
Let G = (G, g, p) be a represented group and let A be an adversary. Consider the following experiment, where M , N and X are elements in G,
Now define the advantage of A in violating the CCDH assumption with respect to (M, N, X), the advantage of A, and the advantage function of the group, respectively, as follows:
where the maximum is over all A with time-complexity at most t. ♦ Password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman: PCCDH. The passwordbased chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman problem is a variation of the chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman described above that is more appropriate to the password-based setting. The inputs to the problem and the adversarial goals are also somewhat different in this case so let us explain it.
Let D = {1, . . . , n} be a dictionary containing n equally likely password values and let P be a public injective map P from {1, . . . , n} into Z p . An example of an admissible map P is the one in which {1, . . . , n} is mapped into the subset {1, . . . , n} of Z p . Now let us consider an adversary that runs in two stages. In the first stage, the adversary is given as input three random elements M , N and X in G as well as the public injective map P and it outputs a value Y in G. Next, we choose a random password k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and give it to the adversary. We also compute the mapping r = P(k) of the password k. The goal of the adversary in this second stage is to output a value K such that K = CDH(X/M r , Y /N r ).
Note that an adversary that correctly guesses the password k in its first stage can easily solve this problem by computing r = P(k) and making, for instance, Y = g ·N r and K = X/M r . Since we assume k to be chosen uniformly at random from the dictionary {1, . . . , n}, an adversary that chooses to guess the password and follow this strategy can succeed with probability 1/n.
The idea behind the password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman assumption is that no adversary can do much better than the adversary described above. In fact, as we later prove, this should be the case as long as the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in G. We now proceed with the formal definition.
Definition 2 (PCCDH)
Now define the advantage of A in violating the PCCDH assumption with respect to (M, N, X , P), the advantage of A, and the advantage function of the group, respectively, as follows:
where the maximum is over all A with time-complexity at most t. ♦ Set password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman: S-PCCDH. The set password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman problem (S-PCCDH) is a multidimensional variation of the password-based chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman problem described above, in which the adversary is allowed to return not one key but a list of keys at the end of the second stage. In this case, the adversary is considered successful if the list of keys contains the correct value. We now proceed with the formal definition.
Definition 3 (S-PCCDH).
Let G = (G, g, p) be a represented group and let A be an adversary. Consider the following experiment, where M and N are elements in G, and P is a public injective map from {1, . . . , n} into Z p ,
Experiment Exp
As above, we define the advantage of A in violating the S-PCCDH assumption with respect to (M, N, X , P), the advantage of A, and the advantage function of the group, respectively, as follows:
where the maximum is over all A with time-complexity at most t. ♦
Some relations
In this section, we first provide two relations between the above problems. The first result is meaningful for small n (polynomially bounded in the asymptotic framework). The second one considers larger dictionaries. Then, we show that these assumptions are implied by the classical computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Finally, we also prove that the most general assumption is also implied by the classical computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Relations between the PCCDH and CCDH problems. The following two lemmas present relations between the PCCDH and CCDH problems. The first lemma, whose proof can be found in Appendix B, is oriented to the case of small dictionaries, for which n is polynomially-bounded. However, if n is large, super-polynomial in the asymptotic framework, or more concretely n ≥ 8/ , then one should use the second lemma, whose proof can be easily derived from the proof of the first lemma (see Appendix B).
Lemma 4. Let G = (G, g, p) be a represented group, let n be an integer, and let P be a public injective map from {1, . . . , n} into Z p .
Lemma 5. Let G = (G, g, p) be a represented group, let n be an integer, and let P be a public injective map from {1, . . . , n} into Z p .
where τ denotes the time for an exponentiation in G.
Relation between the CCDH and CDH problems. The following lemma, whose proof is in Appendix B, shows that the CCDH and CDH problems are indeed equivalent.
Lemma 6. Let G = (G, g, p) be a represented group.
Relation between the S-PCCDH and CDH problems. The following lemma, whose proof is in Appendix B, gives a precise relation between the S-PCCDH and CDH problems.
Lemma 7. Let G = (G, g, p) be a represented group, let n and s be integers, and let P be a public injective map from {1, . . . , n} into Z p .
where t = 4t + (18 + 2s)τ and τ denotes the time for an exponentiation in G. More concretely,
SPAKE1: a simple non-concurrent password-based encrypted key exchange
We now introduce our first protocol, SPAKE1, which is a non-concurrent password-based encrypted key exchange protocol, based on the multi-dimensional version of password-based chosenbasis computational Diffie-Hellman problem, S-PCCDH.
Description
SPAKE1 is a variation of the password-based encrypted key exchange protocol of Bellovin and Merritt [7] , in which we replace the encryption function E pw (.) with a simple one-time pad function. More specifically, whenever a user A wants to send the encryption of a value X ∈ G to a user B, it does so by computing X · M pw , where M is an element in G associated with user A and the password pw is assumed to be in Z p . The session identification is defined as the transcript of the conversation between A and B, and the session key is set to be the hash (random oracle) of the session identification, the user identities, and the Diffie-Hellman key. The password pw is not an input to the hash function. The full description of SPAKE1 is given in Figure 2 .
Correctness. The correctness of our protocol follows from the fact that, in an honest execution of the protocol, K A = K B = g xy .
Security
As Theorem 8 states, our non-concurrent password-based key exchange protocol is secure in the random oracle model as long as we believe that the S-PCCDH problem is hard in G. Theorem 8. Let G be a represent group and let D be a uniformly distributed dictionary of size |D|. Let SPAKE1 describe the password-based encrypted key exchange protocol associated with these primitives as defined in Figure 2 . Then, for any numbers t, q start , q A send , q B send , q H , q exe ,
where q H represents the number of queries to the H oracle; q exe represents the number of queries to the Execute oracle; q start and q A send represent the number of queries to the Send oracle with respect to the initiator A; q B send represents the number of queries to the Send oracle with respect to the responder B; q send = q A send + q B send + q start ; t = t + O(q start τ ); and τ is the time to compute one exponentiation in G.
Since the S-PCCDH problem can be reduced to the CDH problem according to Lemma 7,  it follows that SPAKE1 is a secure non-concurrent password-based key exchange protocol in the random oracle model as long as the CDH problem is hard in G, as stated in Corollary 9.
Corollary 9. Let G be a represent group and let D be a uniformly distributed dictionary of size |D|. Let SPAKE1 describe the password-based encrypted key exchange protocol associated with these primitives as defined in Figure 2 . Then, for any numbers t, q start , q A send , q B send , q H , q exe ,
where t = 4t + O((q start + q H )τ ) and the other parameters are defined as in Theorem 8.
Proof idea. Let A be an adversary against the semantic security of SPAKE. The idea is to use A to build adversaries for each of the underlying primitives in such a way that if A succeeds in breaking the semantic security of SPAKE, then at least one of these adversaries succeeds in H oracle -On hash query H(q) (resp. H (q)) for which there exists a record (q, r) in the list ΛH (resp. ΛH ), return r. Otherwise, choose an element r ∈ {0, 1} l k , add the record (q, r) to the list ΛH (resp. ΛH ), and return r. if ActiveSessionIndex = 0 then abort
, assuming B i is in the correct state, we proceed as follows:
, assuming A i is in the correct state, we proceed as follows: breaking the security of an underlying primitive. Our proof consists of a sequence of hybrid experiments, starting with the real attack and ending in an experiment in which the adversary's advantage is 0, and for which we can bound the difference in the adversary's advantage between any two consecutive experiments.
Proof of Theorem 8. Our proof uses a sequence of hybrid experiments, the first of which corresponds to the actual attack. For each experiment Exp n , we define an event Succ n corresponding to the case in which the adversary correctly guesses the bit b involved in the Test query.
Experiment Exp 0 . This experiment corresponds to the real attack, which starts by choosing a random password pw. By definition, we have
Experiment Exp 1 . In this experiment, we simulate the Execute, Reveal, and Send oracles as in the real attack (see Figure 4 and Figure 5 ), after having chosen a random password pw. One can easily see that this experiment is perfectly indistinguishable from the real experiment. Hence,
Experiment Exp 2 . In this experiment, we simulate all oracles as in Experiment Exp 1 , except that we halt all executions in which a collision occurs in the transcript ((A, X ), (B, Y )). Since either X or Y was simulated and thus chosen uniformly at random, the probability of collisions in the transcripts is at most (q send +q exe ) 2 /(2p), according to the birthday paradox. Consequently,
Execute, Reveal and Test queries.
-On query Reveal(U i ), proceed as follows: if session key SK is defined for instance U i then return SK , else return ⊥. -On query Execute(A i , B j ), proceed as follows:
, proceed as follows: Experiment Exp 3 . In this experiment, we replace the random oracle H by a secret one, for computing SK A and SK B for all sessions generated via an Execute oracle query. As the following lemma shows, the difference between the current experiment and the previous one is negligible as long as the CDH assumption holds. More precisely, we use a private random oracle H , and in the Execute oracle queries, one gets SK A , SK B ← H (A, B, Θ , Φ ).
Proof. The proof of Lemma 10 uses the random self-reducibility of the Diffie-Hellman problem. Indeed, the only way for an execution to be altered by the above modification is if the adversary directly asks for H(A, B, Θ , Φ , K), which will output something different from H (A, B, Θ , Φ ), the answer of a Reveal query. But let us simulate the Execute oracle with a Diffie-Hellman instance (A, B), and thus Θ ← A · g θ and Φ ← B · g φ . As a consequence, the above event means that K = CDH(Θ, Φ) = CDH(A, B) × A φ × B θ × g φθ is in the list of the queries asked to H: a random guess leads to CDH(A, B).
Experiment Exp 4 . The goal of this experiment is to bound the advantage of the adversary during active attacks, in which the adversary has possibly generated the input of a Send oracle. To achieve this goal, we change the simulation of the Send oracle so that its output is chosen uniformly at random and independently of the password. The session key associated with each oracle is a bit string of appropriate length chosen uniformly at random and independently of input being provided to the Send oracle. The exact simulation of the Send oracle is as follows:
-On a query of type (A i , start ), we reply with (A, X = g x ) for a random x ∈ Z p , if A i is in the correct state. If another concurrent session already exists for user A, then we also terminate that session. -On a query of type (B i , (A, X )), we reply with (B, Y = g y ) for a random y ∈ Z p and we set the session key SK B to H (A, B, X , Y ), if B i is in the correct state. -On a query of type (A i , (B, Y ) ), we set the session key SK A to H (A, B, X , Y ), if A i is in the correct state.
As the following lemma shows, the adversary cannot do much better than simply guessing the password when distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is based on a sequence of q A send + q B send + 1 hybrid experiments Hybrid 3,j , where j is an index between 0 and q AB = q A send + q B send . Let i be a counter for number of queries of the form (B k , (A, X )) or (A k , (B, Y ) ). That is, we do not count start queries (we do not increment this counter). We define Experiment Hybrid 3,j as follows:
-If i ≤ j, then we processes the current Send query as in Experiment Exp 4 .
-If i > j, then we processes the current Send query as in Experiment Exp 3 .
It is clear from the above definition that experiments Hybrid 3,0 and Hybrid 3,q AB are equivalent to experiments Exp 3 and Exp 4 , respectively. Now let P j denote the probability of event Succ in Experiment Hybrid 3,j . It follows that Pr[ Succ 3 ] = P 0 and Pr[ Succ 4 ] = P q AB . Moreover,
The lemma will follow easily from bounding P j − P j−1 . In order to so, consider the following algorithm D j for the S-PCCDH problem in G.
Algorithm D j . Let U = g u , V = g v , and W = g w be random elements in G and let P be any injective map from {1, . . . , n} into Z p . D j starts running A, simulating all its oracles. The Reveal, Execute, and Test oracles are simulated as in Experiment Exp 3 . The Send oracle is simulated as follows, Let i be the index of the current Send query.
-If the Send query is of the form (A k , start ),
• if i ≤ j, then D j replies with (A, X = W g x ) for a random x ∈ Z p , if A k is in the correct state. If another concurrent session already exists for user A, then D j also terminates that session.
• if i > j, then D j processes it as in Experiment Exp 3 .
-If the query is of the form (B k , (A, X )),
• if i < j, then D j processes it as in Experiment Exp 4 .
• if i = j, then D j replies with (B, Y = W ). It also returns (st, Y = X ) as the output of its find stage and waits for the input (st, k) of the guess stage. It then sets the password pw shared between A and B to P(k) and the session key SK B to H(A, B, X , Y , K B ), where K B = (X /V pw ) w−u pw . We note that st should contain all the necessary information for D j to continue the execution of A and the simulation of its oracles in the guess stage. Let this be Case B.
-If the Send query is of the form (A k , (B, Y ) ),
• if i = j, and A k is in the correct state, then it returns (st, Y = Y ) as the output of its find stage and waits for the input (st, k) of the guess stage. Then, it sets the password pw shared between A and B to P(k) and the session key SK A to H(A, B, X , Y , K A ), where K A = (Y /V pw ) w+x −u pw . Let this be Case A.
Let K be the part of the input of H that is not present in H and let K 1 , . . . , K q H be the list of all such elements. When in Case A, D j sets K i = K i /(Y /V pw ) x for i = 1, . . . , q H , where x is the value used to compute X in the crucial query. When in Case B, D j simply sets
We note that in the above, the password is only defined at the j-th step and it is not used before that. Due to the non-concurrency, we do not need to know the password for simulating flows in Experiment Exp 4 . We only need it in Experiment Exp 3 .
Using the knowledge of u, v, and w in the above, it is clear that the processing of the Send queries matches that of Experiment Hybrid 3,j−1 . However, in the actual description of the S-PCCDH problem, we do not have access to these values. For this reason, the actual algorithm D j replaces the random oracle H by a secret random oracle H in the computation of SK A and SK B during the processing of the j-th Send query. More precisely, it computes SK A and SK B as H (A, B, X , Y ) . Moreover, we note that in this new scenario, the processing of the Send queries matches that of Experiment Hybrid 3,j .
Probability analysis. Let AskH represent the event in which the adversary asks for H(A, B, X , Y , K), where K = CDH(X /U pw , Y /V pw ) and either X or Y is involved in the crucial j-th query. We first observe that experiments Hybrid 3,j−1 and Hybrid 3,j are identical if event AskH does not happen. Therefore, it follows that the probability difference
However, whenever event AskH happens, we know that the list of queries asked to H contains the key K = CDH(X /U pw , Y /V pw ) involved in the crucial query, and thus D j will be able to successfully use A to help it solve the S-PCCDH problem. This is because K A (Case A) or K B (Case B) can be used to compute the solution CDH(W/U pw , Y /V pw ) for the S-PCCDH problem as follows:
Therefore, the list of candidates K 1 , . . . , K q H outputted by D j should contain the solution for the S-PCCDH problem whenever AskH happens. Hence, Pr[ AskH ] is less than or equal to the success probability of D j . The lemma follows easily from the fact that D j has time-complexity at most t .
5 SPAKE2: a simple concurrent password-based encrypted key exchange
We now introduce our second protocol, SPAKE2, which is a concurrent password-based encrypted key exchange protocol, based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, CDH.
Description
SPAKE2 is a also variation of the password-based encrypted key exchange protocol of Bellovin and Merritt [7] and is almost exactly like SPAKE1. The only difference between the two is in the key derivation function, which also includes the password pw. More specifically, the session key in SPAKE2 is set to be the hash (random oracle) of the session identification, the user identities, the Diffie-Hellman key, and the password. In other words, SK ← H(A, B, X , Y , pw, K). The session identification is still defined as the transcript of the conversation between A and B.
Security
As the following theorem states, our concurrent password-based key exchange protocol is secure in the random oracle model as long as the CDH problem is hard in G. 
where the parameters are defined as in Theorem 8.
where all the variables follow the distribution defined in Experiment Exp pccdh G,n (A, M, N, X , P), for uniformly distributed M, N, X ∈ G and b ∈ {0, 1}. The probability space is thus defined by the variables ω, ρ, the random tapes of the adversary in the find-stage and the guess-stage respectively; M, N, X , the group elements; and k, the password:
By definition, we have
Applying the splitting lemma 13, we get that if we split Ω 0 into Ω 1 × Ω 1 :
there exists a set S 1 ⊆ Ω 1 such that
.
Applying again the splitting lemma 13, we get that if we split Ω 1 into Ω 2 × Ω 2 : Let (U, V, X) be a random instance of the CCDH problem. We choose a random tape ω R ← {0, 1} , and two random indices i < j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then, we define r = P(i) and r = P(j), and then set δ = r − r, M = U 1/δ , N = V 1/δ , as well as X = X × M r . Since (U, V, X) is a random triple, (M, N, X ) is also uniformly distributed (and thus independently of r and r , and thus of i and j): with probability greater than 1/n + , A wins the Experiment Exp pccdh G,n (A, M, N, X , P), with k = i, and the random tape (ω, ρ). In the favorable case, we have ω ∈ S 1 and (M, N, X ) ∈ S 2 (ω) with probability n 2 + 2n × n 4 + 2n
Thereafter, with probability greater than /4, A wins the Experiment Exp pccdh G,n (A, M, N, X , P), with k = j, and the random tape (ω, ρ ):
Since we assumed, in the theorem, that 2/n ≥ 1/n + , then 1 + n ≤ 2. Furthermore, This concludes the proof of this lemma.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 4 and is hence omitted in this version of the paper.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 6
Let us consider an instance A, B for the Diffie-Hellman problem. We choose a random b ∈ Z p . 
B.4 Proof of Lemma 7
In this proof, we use a general technique presented in [23] for computing the solution of a given instance of a problem by finding a collision between the list of candidates for two related instances. On a given A, B instance of the Diffie-Hellman problem, we use exactly the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4, running the S-PCCDH algorithm to break two instances of the CCDH problem: U 1 = Ag u 1 , V 1 = Bg v 1 and X 1 = A b 1 , and U 2 = Ag u 2 , V 2 = Bg v 2 and X 2 = A b 2 , for random values u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 , b 1 , b 2 ∈ Z p . We then get four sets, S 1 , S 1 , S 2 and S 2 , (instead of values) which contain candidates for CDH(X 1 , Y 1 ), CDH(X 1 /U 1 , Y 1 /V 1 ), CDH(X 2 , Y 2 ) and CDH(X 2 /U 2 , Y 2 /V 2 ) respectively. Therefore, with probability greater than (n 3 /128) 2 , each set contains the correct value. Note that
